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AZIZAH Y. AL-HIBRI 
* 
THE ISSUE of conflicting rights raised by Susan Okin's paper is 
of fundamental importance to any serious human rights discourse. 
Okin's perspective, discussion, and proposal, 'however, all suffer 
from three fatal problems: ( 1) stereotypical views of the "Other"; (2) 
a conflation of distinct belief systems; and ( 3) conflict with American 
constitutional principles. 
The paper is clearly written from the perspective of the dominant 
cultural "!," a Western point of view burdened with immigrant 
problems and the human rights conflicts they engender. Okin blames 
this conflict on a Western liberal tradition that recognizes value in 
the very existence of cultural diversity. 1 She argues that some cul-
tures may in fact be worthy of extinction.' 
Okin's statement is remarkable in its honesty. If she is right about 
the universality of her principles, then, of course, why should 
women from other cultures have a lower standard of human rights 
crafted especially for them? In fact, whether immigrants or residents 
in their home country, why should women wait for salvation, when 
the West can readily defend their rights by use of force if necessary? 
Certainly, Okin's position has more integrity than one which views 
the "natives" or "alien immigrants" condescendingly and argues, 
under the guise of Western liberalism, that "those people" should 
be allowed to live in accordance with their own lower standards of 
human rights. 
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Luckily, these two options are not exhaustive. To recognize other 
alternatives, we need to revisit Okin's article and uncover its first 
fatal error. A quick look at her endnotes reveals what was already 
obvious to a culturally sensitive reader: her understanding of other 
cultures/religions is derived from secondary sources outside these 
cultures/religions. As a result, Okin commits simple but significant 
factual errors in assessing other belief systems. She argues, for exam-
ple, that "the founding myths" of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
"are rife with attempts to justify the control and subordination of 
women" and, among other things, characterize women as "overly 
emotional, untrustworthy, evil, or sexually dangerous." 3 As proof, 
she offers two stories: the creation of Eve out of part of Adam and 
the fall of Adam. 
But the Qur'an nowhere says that Eve was created out of part of 
Adam. In fact, the Qur' an clearly states that males and females were 
created by God from the same nafs (soul or spirit), and that the most 
honored among them in the sight of God is the most pious. 4 The 
story of the fall of Adam is also different in the Qur'an. Both Adam 
and Eve were tempted by Satan, and both succumbed. 5 The story is . 
thus about the human condition. It is not about gender. By missing 
these important differences, Okin attributes to Islam a position 
based on biblical analysis. This is a serious form of religious reduc-
tionism. It is also the example par excellence of Okin speaking in 
her dominant voice about the inessential Other. So inessential is this 
Other that, even when included in the discussion, it is rendered re-
markably indistinguishable and voiceless. It is allowed into the dis-
cussion only through the voice and perceptions of the dominant "I." 
Given these ground rules, it is hard to have a serious discussion or 
reach a democratic resolution of existing conflicts. 
The importance of a genuine dialogue is that it permits a more 
accurate diagnosis of the problems at hand. While "founding 
myths" are not patriarchal in Islam, several jurists have succeeded 
in developing a patriarchal interpretation of various Qur'anic pas-
sages.6 It is these passages with the related jurisprudence, and not 
the "founding myths," that need to be addressed in Islam. Unfortu-
nately, an Orientalist reductionist approach to Islam often delays 
productive dialogue.7 
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